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CHAPTER II 
CLAIMS CONCERNING LAWFUL COMBATANTS 
The most general claim concerning combatants in naval warfare is that 
it is lawful to use all efficient vessels, aircraft, and personnel against the 
enemy. As stated in Chapter I, submarines have been the subject of claims 
and counterclaims concerning their combatant status. If -the claim to deny 
submarines lawful combatant status or to "abolish" them were successful, 
it would deprive the submarine officers and crew of status as lawful com-
batants. A related claim is that the submarine must be "limited" by law in 
some way. 
A. WARSHIPS AS LAWFUL COMBATANTS 
It is well known that not everyone may lawfully participate in combat 
during war or hostilities. Both public authorization and public control 
have been traditionally required in order to confer the status of lawful 
combatants.1 Thus, soldiers, sailors, and airmen who are members of the 
public armed forces are typical lawful combatants. 2 They are authorized 
by their government to commit acts of regulated and controlled coercion 
and violence. "Lawful combatants" is used to refer to those indviduals 
who, if captured by the enemy, must be accorded all the rights provided 
by international law for prisoners of war. "Unlawful combatants," in 
contrast, is used to refer to those individuals who, upon capture, are 
subject to punishment if they lack public authorization and control. 
In land hostilities the individual is regarded as the basic unit of military 
force and, consequently, it is important that he be identified indvidually 
as having combatant status.3 In sea and air hostilities the individual com-
batant is usually associated with a combatant unit such as a warship or 
1 The customary law requirements stated in the text are reflected in Hague Con-
vention VII ( 1907). Art. 1 requires both governmental ''authority" and "control" 
over a warship which is converted from a merchant ship. These are the same require-
ments which apply to warships generally. 
2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 255. Army persohnel, such as the crews of the Japanese 
Army submarines mentioned in the text of Ch. I accompanying note 30 are, of course, 
lawful combatants in naval war. 
3 The uniform is regarded as more important in land than in naval or air war. 
See Spaight 100- 04. 
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military aircraft.4 A warship or military aircraft is a lawful combatant 
unit since its personnel comply with the dual juridical requirements of 
public authorization and public control. 
Where they are separated from their vessel or aircraft, as in a shipwreck 
or forced landing situation, naval officers and crewmen retain their status 
as lawful combatants. In the same way, such officers and sailors who 
conduct hostilities apart from warships and naval aircraft, such as the 
U.S. Navy's underwater demolition teams composed of swimmers/ are 
lawful combatants. There can be no doubt concerning the lawful comba-
tant status in such a situation but, as a practical matter it may be particu-
larly desirable for such combatants to carry military identification tags or 
to wear uniforms in order to facilitate their identification. If questions 
are raised concerning lawful combatant status, reasonable doubts in estab-
lishing identification should be resolved in favor of those claiming such 
status. 
The necessity for according prisoner of war status to all lawful comba-
tants is illustrated by the Trial of Schoengrath 6 before a British Military 
Court in Germany in 1946. In this case the defendants, seven members 
of the Nazi SS, were charged with committing a war crime "in the killing 
of an unknown Allied airman, a prisoner of war." 7 The facts concerned 
an airman who had descended by parachute from his bomber aircraft 
which had been flying westward over occupied Holland. The defendants, 
apparently acting on the assumption that he was an Allied airman, shot 
him shortly after his capture rather than accord him status as a prisoner 
of war. The defense contended that there was no case to answer because 
the prosecution had produced no evidence to show that the victim was 
in fact an Allied airman.8 The prosecution replied that it was too far-
fetched to assume that the bomber aircraft involved, in view of the facts, 
was a neutral aircraft.9 The court convicted the defendants as charged 
even though the nationality of the airman was not proved. The decision 
is sound because the airman was entitled to prisoner of war status in the 
light of the facts which were shown. Even if he had been a neutral national 
serving in the air force of an Allied state, he would have been a lawful 
combatant. 
Where an individual is entitled to status as a prisoner of war, he must 
not be subjected to discriminatory treatment. This doctrine is prescribed 
• Such combatant units typically display the national flag or emblem as an identify~ 
ing mark. 
5 Factual description appears in Fane & Moore, "The Naked Warriors," 82 Nav. 
Inst. Proc. 913 (1956). 
6 11 Reps. U.N. Comm. 83. 
7 Ibid. 
8 I d. at 84. 
9 Ibid. 
31 
in appropriately broad terms in the Geneva Convention, Relative to the 
Treatlnent of Prisoners of War ( 1949) : 
Taking into consideration the provisions of the present Convention 
relating to rank and sex, and subject to any privileged treatment 
which may be accorded to them by reason of their state of health, 
age or professional qualifications, all prisoners of war shall be treated 
alike by the Detaining Power, without any adverse distinction based 
on race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions, or any other 
distinction founded on similar criteria.10 
Since the submarine warship is subject to the same public authorization 
and control as any other warship, it appears to qualify as a lawful combat-
ant unit. If a submarine is a lawful combatant, its personnel are entitled 
to prisoner of war status if they are captured. Claims to abolish or limit 
submarines are based upon the implicit premise of their existing lawful 
combatant status. 
B. CLAIMS TO "ABOLISH" OR LIMIT SUBMARINES AS COM-
BATANTS 
1. The Hague Peace Conferences 
The primary work of the Hague Conferences was the legal regulation 
of warfare rather than the establishment of peace. 
a. THE 1899 CONFERENCE 
The Russian Emperor issued the first invitation for the 1899 Con-
ference with stated objectives which included ending "these incessant 
armaments." 11 Apparently the negative reaction of the powers required 
the second invitation which relegated disarmament, except that concern-
ing submarines, to a secondary role.12 The motivation for the Conference 
has been ascribed to the humanitarian personal characteristics of the 
Czar.13 It probably was at least partly due to the superiority of other states 
over Russia in military and naval technology and armament. It was cau-
tiously proposed in the first article of the second invitation that consider-
ation be given to not increasing existing military forces and to making 
"a preliminary examination of the means by which a reduction might even 
be effected in the forces and Budgets [sic J above mentioned." 14 Other 
subjects proposed as the second and third articles respectively were the 
limitation of guns and explosives to prohibit any more powerful than those 
10 Art. 16. Spaight 105-07 sets forth incidents demonstrating the lack of a "colour 
line" in air warfare. 
11 Rescript of the Russian Emperor (Aug. 24, 1898) . 2 Scott 1 at 2. 
12 Russian Circular (Jan. 11, 1899). 2 Scott 3. 
13 By Prof. James Brown Scott. 1 Scott 39. 
H 2 Scott 4. 
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then in use.15 "The subjects to be submitted for international disucussion 
at the Conference" included, as the fourth article, the proposal 
To prohibit the use, in naval warfare, of submarine torpedo boats 
or plungers, or other similar engines of destruction .... 16 
The proposal was at a time when no new major war appeared to threaten 
the peace of the world and when the submarine or "plunger" was a 
relatively new and untried vessel. 
Secretary of State Hay instructed the United States delegation on these 
points in no uncertain terms: 
The second, third, and fourth articles, relating to the non-employ-
ment of firearms, explosives, and other destructive agents, the restricted 
use of existing instruments of destruction, and the prohibition of 
certain contrivances employed in naval warfare, seem lacking in 
practicability, and the discussion of these propositions would prob-
ably prove provocative of divergence rather than unanimity of views. 
It is doubtful if wars are to be diminished by rendering them less 
destructive, for it is the plain lesson of history that the periods of 
peace have been longer protracted as the cost and destructiveness 
of war have increased. The expediency of restraining the inventive 
genius of our people in the direction of devising means of defense 
is by no means clear, and, considering the temptations to which men 
and nations may be exposed in a time of conflict, it is doubtful if an 
international agreement to this end would prove effective. The dissent 
of a single powerful nation might render it altogther nugatory. The 
.delegates are, therefore, enjoined not to give the weight of their 
influence to the promotion of projects the realization of which is 
so uncertain.17 
The combined instructions and rationale just quoted fixed the position 
of the United States delegation. The views of the various delegations on 
the Russian proposal to ban submarines were expressed on May 31, 1899.18 
The German delegate, representing a state engaged in the construction 
of a great surface navy, favored interdiction conditioned upon unanimity. 
The Japanese and Italian delegates stated their opinions as being similar 
to the German. The British delegate, representing the preeminent naval 
power, favored prohibition providing only that the Great Powers agreed. 
The lesser naval powers could be expected to take a different view. The 
delegate of Austria-Hungary represented a state which possessed no sub-: 
mannes but in the personal view of the delegate they "may be used for 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 2 Scott 6 at 7-8. 
18 The views of the delegations summarized in the two textual paragraphs appear 
in Scott ( ed.), The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences: The Conference of 
1899 367-68 (1920). 
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the defense of ports and roadsteads and render very important services." 
The delegate of France, representing a country with a navy and a building 
program inferior to that of Great Britain or Germany, stated his country's 
position "that the submarine torpedo [boat] has an eminently defensive 
purpose, and that the right to use it should therefore not be taken from 
a country." The Netherlands delegate characterized the submarine as "the 
weapon of the weak" 19 and so not subject to prohibition. The delegate of 
Sweden-Norway concurred with the Netherlands views. The Turkish 
delegate wished to reserve the defensive use of submarines. The delegate 
of Siam wished to refer the matter to his Governn1ent since he had general 
instructions to favor humanitarian interests but believed that "the neces-
sities of defense of the small nations must be taken into serious consider-
ation." The Danish delegate, perhaps surprisingly, thought that his 
Government, to which he referred the qu_estion, would favor prohibition 
conditioned upon unanimity. The attitude of Russia was not in doubt but 
its desire for pr~hibition was also conditioned on unanimity. The dominant 
view of the smaller naval powers was that submarines constituted a cheap 
means of defense and so could not be prohibited. 
Three weeks later the question of prohibiting submarines was put to a 
vote in plenary meeting. The voting was recorded as follows: 20 
For prohibition with reservation (of unspecified character) : Belgium, 
Greece, Persia, Siam, and Bulgaria (five states) . 
For prohibition with reservation of unanimity: Germany, Italy, Great 
Britain, Japan, and Roumania (five states) . 
Against prohibition: United States, Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Spain, 
France, Portugal, Sweden-Norway, Netherlands, and Turkey (nine states). 
Abstaining: Russia, Serbia, and Switzerland (three states). 
Thus the first attempt to make the submarine an unlawful combatant 
ended in failure. 
b. THE 1907 CONFERENCE 
During the Russo-Japanese War, President Theodore Roosevelt 
took the initiative in calling the Conference of 1907 21 and, after the Peace 
Treaty of Portsmouth ending that war, the President allowed the Czar 
to become the nominal initiator as a matter of diplomatic courtesy. 22 By 
1907 most of the major navies contained submarines and neither the 
19 That the submarine is the weapon of the weak is argued in Castex, "The Weapon 
of the Weak- A French View," 77]. Royal United Serv. Inst. 737 (1932). The 
contrary appears in Richmond, "The Weapon of the Weak," 77 ]. Royal United 
Serv. Inst. 497 (1932). 
20 The voting is recorded in Scott, op. cit. supra note 18 at 299 . 
. 
21 1 Scott 91 - 93. 
22 !d. at 93. 
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diplomatic correspondence issued by the President nor that issued by the 
Czar suggested their abolition. 
The Russo-Japanese War demonstrated the serious apprehensions of the 
Russian Navy concerning submarines. On April 13, 1904 two first-class 
Russian battleships struck Japanese mines off Port Arthur and one sank 
while the other was severely damaged. This event has been described 
as follows: 
[The] disaster seems to have caused something approaching a panic 
in the Russian fleet. Ships began to fire wildly at the water round 
them, apparently under the impression that they were being attacked 
by submarine boats .... 23 
The 1907 Conference recognized by necessary implication the lawful 
co:rpbatant status of surface torpedo boats, surface torpedo boat destroyers, 
and also submarines. It did this by regulating their principal weapon, 
the self-propelled torpedo. Hague Convention VIII provided that torpe-
does must be so constructed that those which miss their mark then become 
harmless. 24 Of course, where the target was missed the primary military 
value of the self-propelled torpedo was eliminated and the regulation only 
prevented its use as a floating mine. And so the stage was laid for the 
submarine to be used in World War I. 
2. The First World War 
a. THE PUNITIVE TREATMENT OF CAPTURED PER-
SONNEL 
In the early part of World War I, during the incumbency of 
Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty, the British Government 
adopted a system of punitive treatment for certain German prisoners of 
war in its hands. The prisoners of war involved consisted of thirty-nine 
officers and men who comprised the surviving crew members of two Ger-
man submarines. 25 All of these submarine prisoners were segregated in 
naval detention barracks and some of them were held there in solitary 
confinement. The German Government promptly retaliated by placing an 
equal number of British Army officers in solitary confinement. Thereafter, 
the British Government changed its policy and treated captured German 
submarine personnel in the same way as other prisoners of war. The British 
claim to accord punitive treatment to German submarine personnel was 
in substance a claim that German submarines were unlawful combatants 
23 1 British Committee of Imperial Defense, Official History (Naval and Military) 
of Russo-] apanese War 94 ( 1910). In the same war Russia attempted to create a 
submarine flotilla in the Far East by transporting submarines in sections overland. 
2 id. 639. 
2
i Art. 1, paragraph 3. 
25 The textual statements are based upon 2 Garner 50-51. 
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and that their personnel, upon capture, were not entitled to nondiscrimina-
tory treatment as prisoners of war. 26 
The case of Captain Fryatt, which also arose in the early part of the 
First World War, concerns the related issue of the status of merchant ship 
personnel.27 Captain Fryatt of the British unarmed merchant ship Brussels 
refused to surrender to a German submarine and attempted, without suc-
cess, _to ram the submarine as it approached his ship. Subsequently he was 
captured and the German Govemmen t declined to accord him prisoner 
of war status. Following a court-martial he was executed on the charge of 
having committed "a franc-tireur crime against the sea forces of Ger-
many." 28 The official German statement announcing the execution stated 
that Fryatt was "not a member of a combatant force" and that he had 
been condemned to death because of his attempted attack upon a German 
submarine. 29 Thus the German claim rested , upon the simple premise that 
Captain Fryatt was an unlawful combatant who violated the laws of war 
by his attempted attack. Professor Gamer describes the execution as a 
"plain act of judicial murder." 30 
b. THE PARTIAL "ABOLITION" OF SUBMARINES 
During the First World War any doubts as to the efficiency of sub-
marine naval vessels were removed. It is well known that Germany used 
submarines to bring Great Britain to the brink of defeat. The United 
States claimed that the German methods of submarine warfare were 
illegal but did not claim that the submarine was an unlawful combatant 
unit. 31 
Following the war, the Central Powers' submarines existing or in process 
of construction were transferred to the Allies or broken up. 32 Submarines 
were abolished for Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey by 
prohibiting each of them to acquire submarines through an article employ-
ing the following uniform language which appeared in each peace treaty 
with the five states just named: 
26 Prof. Garner's account also states that the two German submarines involved had 
been "sinking British and neutral merchant vessels." 2 Garner 50. Therefore, issues 
concerning objects and methods of attack may also be involved. The text, however, 
only considers the central issue concerning combatant status. 
27 The textual statements are based upon 1 Garner 407-13. 
28 Quoted in 1 Garner 408. 
29 1 Garner 408, note 1. 
30 !d. at 413. See Scott, "The Execution qf Captain Fryatt," 9 A.].I.L. 865 ( 1916). 
31 Hyde 2007. 
32 The Treaty of Versailles with Germany, arts. 181, 188; the Treaty of St. Ger-
main with Austria, arts. 136, 138; the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary, arts. 120, 
122; the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria, arts. 83, 84; the (unratified) Treaty of 
Sevres with Turkey, arts. 184, 185. The cited treaties appear in 1 & 2 Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923 (1924). 
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The construction or acquisition of any submarine, even for commercial 
purposes, shall be forbidden in 33 
Thus partial abolition was obtained as one of the fruits of victory. 
3. Naval Disarmament and Limitation Between the World Wars 
a. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE (1921-1922) 
An observer has stated that the United States was the only state 
in a position to call a conference on the limitation of armament following 
World War !. 34 The United States was building the largest navy in the 
world and was not a member of the League of Nations, which organization 
was therefore precluded from effective action. 35 The United States posi-
tion appeared to be that it could achieve agreement on the limitation of 
naval armament by giving up its great building program. 36 
In addition to the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, the 
two principal European naval powers, France and Italy, were participants. 
( 1) The Washington Naval Treaty ( 1922) 
The United States naval disarmament proposals presented by 
Secretary of State Hughes were comprehensive and specific. 37 They were 
based on four stated "general principles": 3 8 ( 1) the elimination of actual 
and projected capital shipbuilding. programs; (2) additional reduction by 
scrapping of certain older capital ships; (3) regard for "existing naval 
strength"; ( 4) the existing capital ship tonnage as the basis for proportion-
ate. allowance of tonnage for other combatant vessels. It was specifically 
proposed that the United States and Great Britain would each be allowed 
90,000 tons of submarines to 54,000 tons for Japan.39 But before the ques-
tion of limitation of submarines was considered, Great Britain, through 
Lord Lee, the First Lord of the Admiralty, proposed their abolition to 
the Committee on Limitation of Armament. 
(a) ABOLITION 
On December 22, 1921 Lord Lee presented an indictment of 
33 The Treaty of Versailles art. 191; the Treaty of St. Germain art. 140; the 
Treaty of Trianon art. 124; the Treaty of Neuilly art. 86; the Treaty of Sevres art. 
186. 
The British approved dropping the ban on submarines of the Versailles Treaty 
in the Anglo-German Naval Agreement (June 18, 1935). See Watt, "Anglo-German 
Naval Negotiations on the Eve of the Second World War, Part 1," 103 ]. Royal 
United Serv. Inst. 201 ( 1958). 
34 Buell, The Washington Conference 14 7 ( 1922). 
3.'> Ibid. 
36 See id. at 152. 
37 Wash. Conf. 56-63. 
38 !d. at 56. 
39 Id. at 61. 
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the submarine. 40 The French view of the need for a large new French 
submarine fleet had already alarmed the British. In demanding the "total 
and final abolition" of the submarine, Lord Lee attempted to make it 
perfectly clear that the British had "no unworthy or selfish motives." 41 On 
the contrary, they were fighting the battle not only of the allied and 
associated powers but of the entire civilized world.42 He explained that 
the history of the recent war had demonstrated in convincing fashion that 
submarines constituted neither effective nor economical defense for the 
smaller powers.43 During the World War, Germany had employed 375 
submarines and 203 of these had been sunk. He pointed out that millions 
of British and American troops had been transported across the water 
without the loss of a single man excepting those on hospital ships. The 
submarine, in the British view, was effective only against merchant ship-
ping. During the war over 12 million tons ~f such shipping had been sunk 
along with the killing of 20,000 noncombatant men, women, and children. 
Before the end' of his speech, Lord . Lee admitted that antisubmarine 
warfare was a very expensive matter indeed. During the war the United 
Kingdom had maintained "an average of no less than 3,000 anti-submarine 
surface craft" in order to deal with no more than nine or ten German 
submarines operating at one time on the Atlantic approaches to France 
and Great Britain.44 
A sense of realism concerning Lord Lee's recommendation can best be 
conveyed by direct quotations from it: 
It was a weapon of murder and piracy, involving the drowning of 
noncombatants. It had been used to sink passenger ships, cargo ships, 
and even hospital ships. Technically the submarine was so constructed 
that it could not be utilized to rescue even women and children from 
sinking ships. That was why he hoped that the conference would not 
give it a new lease of life.45 
* * * * * * * 
The submarine was the only class of vessel for which the conference 
was asked to give-he would not say a license, but permission to thrive 
and multiply. It would be a great disappointment if the British Empire 
delegation failed to persuade the conference to get rid of this weapon, 
which involved so much evil to peoples who live on or by the sea. 
To show the earnestness of the British Government in this matter, 
Lord Lee pointed out that Great Britain possessed the largest and 
40 Id. at 264-69. 
41 I d. at 265. 
42 I d. at 268. 
43 The balance of the summary in the textual paragraph is taken from id. at 265- 67. 
44 Wash. Con f. 268. See also the text of Ch. I accompanying note 19. 
45 Wash. Conf. 269. 
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probably the most efficient submarine navy in the world, composed of 
100 vessels of 80,000 tons. She was prepared to scrap the whole of 
this great fleet, to disband the personnel, provided the other powers 
would do the same. That was the British offer to the world, and he 
believed it was a greater contribution to the cause of humanity than 
even the limitation of capital ships.46 
The French, Italian, and Japanese delegations then joined with the 
British in deploring the illegal and inhumane use of submarines by Ger-
many during the World W ar.47 But each of them indicated that submarines 
were regarded as useful for defense and expresssed the conviction that 
submarines could be used consistent with the law.48 
Secretary Hughes then placed the United States on record as opposed 
to abolition by reading the report on submarines which had been prepared 
by the Advisory Committee of the American delegation. The report joined 
in condemning illegal uses of the submarine and considered uses regarded 
as legal in some detail. 49 I t a lso stated : 
The United States would never desire its Navy to undertake un-
limited submarine warfare. In fact, the spirit of fair play of the people 
would bring about the downfall of the administration which attempted 
to sanction its use. 50 
On December 23, 1921 Adm iral de Bon made formal reply to Lord Lee 
for the French Government. 51 He first emphasized the military efficiency 
and uses of submarines and referred to a number of examples drawn 
from the World War. His second and main point concerned the efficiency 
of the submarine against merchant vessels. It started with the usual denun-
ciation of German methods and went on to claim the efficiency of the 
submarine even without the use of such methods. 
Certainly the fruits of submarine warfare \Vould have been smaller 
if they had been obliged to confiine themselves to the limits of honor-
able warfare, but it is impossible to claim that there would have 
been none. 52 
* * * * * * * 
Our opinion is that it is especially the weapon of nations not having 
a large navy. It is, in fact, a comparatively cheap element in naval 
warfare which can be procured in large numbers at a cost far below 
that of capital ships. 53 
46 Ibid. 
47 I d. at 270- 72. 
48 Ibid. 
49 I d . a t 273- 77. 
60 I d . a t 276. 
51 I d. at 278-85. 
52 I d. at 2 81. 
53 I d. at 282. 
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In conclusion, Admiral de Bon stated the French position unequivocally: 
"I believe that 90,000 tons is the absolute minimum for all the navies who 
may want to have a submarine force." 54 This was supported by saying that 
it would only mean ninety vessels of modern type of which, because of 
maintenance and repair requirements, only fifteen or twenty would be capa-
ble of simultaneous action. 55 
Mr. Balfour then made two replies to the French arguments. 56 In his 
second statement he pointed out that France had prevented any consider-
ation of reduction of land armaments because of its need to maintain a 
great army against possible German military resurgence.57 Now it was 
stated that France must also maintain a tremendous submarine fleet. He 
asked as to the value of a French submarine fleet if the German submarine 
fleet were rebuilt. In the British view, such a French submarine fleet would 
be of no value and, futher, France would have to look to British Navy 
antisubmarine forces for protection as it had done before.5 8 
Secretary Hughe,s, as chairman, then formally recognized that it was not 
possible to reach agreement on abolition.59 After complimentary references 
to the substance and spirit of the British proposal, he expressed the hope 
that the discussions on the subject would lead to a denunciation of illegal 
methods of submarine warfare and an undertaking by the five powers to 
assure the application of the principles of international law to such war-
fare.60 In the chairman's view, limitation should be considered unless 
further discussion of abolition was desired.61 Mr. Balfour took the oppor-
tunity to place a brief summary of the British position in the record. 
The British Empire delegation desired formally to place on record 
its opinion that the use of submarines, whilst of small value for defen-
sive purposes, leads inevitably to acts which are inconsistent with the 
laws of war and the dictates of humanity, and the delegation desires 
that united action should be taken by all nations to forbid their main-
tenance, construction, or employment. 62 
Dr. Royse has summarized the outcome of the "submarine debates": 
Utilitarianism appeared at the Washington Conference of 1921-22 
as a dominating motive in the submarine debates. The same attitude 
was taken toward the submarine, by most of the Powers present, as 
54 Id . at 285. 
r;.e; Id . at 284- 85. 
56 I d. at 285-89, 295- 98. 
57 I d . at 295. 
58 I d. at 295-96. 
59 I d. at 300. 
60 I d . at 300-02. 
61 I d. a t 302. 
62 Ib id. 
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that taken by the United States Government during the late [First 
World] war, that the submarine was not an illegitimate weapon in 
itself. 63 
(b) LIMITATION 
Chairman Hughes then turned to the limitation of submarines 
by making a concrete revised proposal on this subject. In lieu of the 90,000 
tons of submarines first proposed for the United States and Great Britain, 
he now proposed 60,000 tons maximum for each. The remaining three 
powers would maintain the status quo and he understood this to be 31,452 
tons for Japan, 31,391 tons for France, and about 21,000 tons for Italy.64 
When the meeting reconvened on December 24 the British delegation 
accepted the chairman's proposal. 65 Admiral de Bon referred to the French 
conception of ninety vessels as a minimum submarine fleet and said that 
the proposal was so far below this that it "was equivalent to abolishing 
the whole French program." 66 Consequently, the French delegation could 
not accept the proposals and must ask instructions of its Government.67 
Italy and Japan also rejected the United States proposals. Italy was will-
ing, however, to accept a maximum of 31,500 tons on condition of parity 
with France.68 Japan insisted on the original United States proposal of 
54,000 tons in spite of the substantial reductions already accepted by the 
United States and Great Britain.69 
Four days later Mr. Sarraut presented the considered views of the 
French Government. After referring to the French acceptance of inferior 
strength in capital ships, he stated that 90,000 tons for submarines consti-
tuted the minimum consistent with his country's vital interests. 70 Thus 
ended the attempt to restrict the total tonnages of submarine fleets. Chair-
man Hughes admitted his disappointment concerning the French position 
on submarines. 71 Mr. Balfour went further and said that the 90,000 tons 
of submarines were intended to destroy commerce.72 In addition, the great 
submarine fleet to be built on the shores closest to Great Britain would 
necessarily be a menace to her.73 Mr. Sarraut indignantly rejected the 
criticisms.74 Mr. Balfour then attempted further explanation of the reasons 
63 Royse 19 (footnote omitted). 
64 Wash. Conf. 303. 
65 I d. at 304. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 I d. at 305. 
69 !d. at 306. 
70 Id. at 309-10. 
71 I d. at 3 1 0-11. 
72 I d. at 3 12. 
73 Id. at 313. 
74 I d. at 314-16. 
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why submarines were a threat to Britain. 75 The records of the Conference 
do not reveal French sympathy for what was regarded as a British problem. 
In addition to the failure to limit the size of submarine forces, the 
ratified Treaty on Limitation of Naval Armament 76 between the five 
naval powers states no limitation on the size or armament of individual 
submarines. This lack of restriction together with the provision in the 
Treaty permitting the stiffening of merchant ships' decks in time of peace 
to facilitate arming them in wartime 77 indicated the probability that 
both submarines and armed merchant ships would be used in the next 
general war. It was probable that aircraft would be used also. The dis-
cussions showed no interest in the "abolition" of military aircraft. Mr. 
Balfour, for example, stated: 
Unlike the case of submarines, in the case of aircraft military and 
civilian uses were not sharply divided. T:Qere was practically no com-
mercial civil use for a submarine, but there were many who thought 
that the development of aerial invention was going to exert an im-
mense influence upon the economic development of mankind and 
upon intercommunication of different peoples. In the present stage 
of their knowledge of air matters it seemed quite impossible to limit 
aircraft designed for commercial uses .... 78 
( 2) The Submarine Treaty ( 1922): Submarine Personnel as 
Pirates 
After it became clear that there would be neither abolition nor 
limitation, as such, of submarines, Mr. Root, a distinguished former Sec-
retary of State of the United States, proposed certain resolutions concern-
ing the rules of submarine warfare. In his view, the resolutions should 
be clear and simple. 79 They were characterized by their terms as "the 
prohibition of the use of submarines in warfare" 80 but actually only pro-
hibited their use against merchant ships. 
In the ensuing discussion, Senator Schanzer, the head of the Italian 
delegation, thought it would be desirable to provide a definition of "mer-
chant craft." 81 Mr. Root replied that, "Throughout all the long history 
of international law no term had been better understood than the term 
75 !d. at 316-17. "There was no doubt that submarines were powerful for the 
destruction of lines of communication; but they were powerless to protect them." 
Id. at 317. 
76 The official text of this Treaty of Feb. 6, 1922 is in 43 Stat. 1655 ( 1923). 
77 Art. 14. 
78 Wash. Con/. 414. 
79 So that they could be understood by "the man in the street and the man on the 
farm ... "Id. at 321. 
80 Wash. Con/. 322. 
81 !d. at 326- 27. 
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'a merchant ship'." 82 Further, the term "could not be made clearer by 
the addition of definitions which would only serve to weaken and confuse 
it." 83 Senator Schanzer later concluded for his delegation that the term 
"merchant vessel" as employed in the resolution was understood to refer 
to "unarmed merchant vessels." 84 
The resolutions were subject to some change before they were written 
into A Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases 
in Warfare. Article I of the proposed treaty laid down certain rules of 
law, stated to be "an established part of international law," 85 concerning 
visit, search, and seizure of merchant vessels as well as attacks upon them. 
Article I further provided : 
Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt 
from the universal rules above stated; and if a submarine cannot 
capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules the existing 
law of nations requires it to desist from attack and from seizure and 
to permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested. 86 
Article III provided: 
The Signatory Powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of the 
humane rules of existing law declared by them with respect to attacks 
upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant ships, further de-
clare that any person in the service of any Power who shall violate 
any of those rules, whether or not such person is under orders of a 
governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws of 
war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of 
piracy and may be brought to trial before the civil or military authori-
ties of any Power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found. 87 
As indicated by the excerpt quoted from article I, as well as by the 
negotiating history and the title of the treaty, the submarine was the 
principal subject. Article III had been broadened beyond submarine 
personnel but, in the light of the experience in the First W?rld War, 
submarine personnel were the principal concern. 
In substance the Root resolutions were an attempt to do indirectly 
what the Conference had declined to do directly, that is, make submarines 
and their personnel unlawful combatants. The attempt, however, was only 
successful in placing conditions upon the combatant status of submarines. 
When the specified rules concerning action against merchant ships are 
violated, the status of the submarine's personnel is assimilated to that of 
82 I d. at 328. 
83 Ibid. 
84 I d. at 365. 
85 Id. at 887. Prof. G. G. Wilson has demonstrated the inaccuracy of the statement: 
U.S. Naval War College, International Law Situations 1930 34,35 (1931) 
86 Wash. Conf. 887. 
87 Ibid. 
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unlawful combatants or pirates. The Root resolutions, including this pro-
vision, received unanimous assent in the Conference. 88 Thereafter, the 
French Government declined to ratify the Submarine Treaty and, con-
sequently, submarines and their personnel remained lawful combatants 
unconditionally. In summary, the submarine came out of the Washington 
Conference with undiminished status as a lawful combatant. 89 
b. THE GENEVA NAVAL CONFERENCE (1927) 
For present purposes this Conference is important because the 
United States changed its position concerning the necessity for submarines 
which it had advanced at the Washington Conference and now favored 
their abolition. In instructing the United States delegation to the Con-
ference, President Coolidge st~ted orally the difficulty of a three-power 
conference abolishing submarines but indicated that we should express 
our willingness to abolish.90 The British were consistent in favoring aboli-
tion and the Japanese were consistent in favoring retention.91 
The 1927 Conference may be described briefly as a failure. France and 
Italy refused to attend and Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States accomplished little or nothing by attending. The United Kingdom 
and the United States became involved in fruitless controversy concerning 
the numbers and types of cruisers.92 
c. THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY (1930) 
The failure of the 1927 Conference was doubtless one of the causes 
of the London Conference of 1930. 
( 1) ABOLITION 
The British invitation to Japan, France, and Italy was shown 
88 I d. at 367-84. Before voting on the provision including the phrase "act of piracy" 
Mr. Hanihara, speaking for the Japanese delegation, asked enlightenment as to its 
meaning. I d. at 385. He received but little clarification from Chairman Hughes and 
Mr. Root. I d. at 383-84. 
89 General description of the Washington Conference appears in Wright, "The 
Washington Conference," 6 Minn. L. Rev. 279 ( 1922). 
The submarine provisions are regarded as based upon "humane sentiments for the 
protection of lives ... " in Anderson, "As If for an Act of Piracy," 16 A.].I.L. 260 
( 1922). They are criticized in Anderson, "Submarines and Disarmament Confer-
ences," 53 Nav. Inst. Proc. 50 ( 1927); Knapp, "Treaty Number Two at the Wash-
ington Conference," 39 Poli. Sci. Q. 201 ( 1924); and Roxburgh, "Submarines at the 
Washington Conference," 3 Brit. Y.B.I.L. 150 ( 1922-23). 
90 Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, June 1, 
1927, [1927] Foreign Rel. U.S. 42 at 43 ( 1942). 
91 The view of each of the three parties is set forth in Dept. of State, Records of 
the Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armaments Held at Geneva from June 20 
to August 4th 1927 passim (1927). 
92 Ibid. See Toynbee, 192 7 Survey of International Affairs 43- 82 ( 1929). 
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to the United States in advance and apparently approved by it. 93 It con- , 
tained the following significant paragraph: 
Since both the Government of the United States and His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom adhere to the attitude that they 
have publicly adopted in regard to the desirability of securing the 
total abolition of the submarine, this matter hardly gave rise to dis-
cussion during the recent conversations. They recognize, however, 
that no final settlement on this subject can be reached except in 
conference with the other naval Powers.94 
The proposal for abolition was made by Mr. Alexander, the First Lord 
of the British Admiralty.95 His summary of the proposal contained five 
major points: 
( 1) In the general interests of humanity. 
( 2) In consideration of our view that these vessels are primarily 
offensive instruments. 
( 3) In order to secure a most substantial contribution to disarmament 
and peace. 
( 4) In view of the very important financial relief to be obtained. 
( 5) In consideration of the conditions of service of the personnel and 
the undue risks which can be abolished. 96 
Mr. Alexander dealt with the humanity point briefly and referred to 
"the feelings of horror which the peoples had experienced as results of 
submarine action" 97 in the First World War. He referred to a number of 
uses of the submarine which were deemed to be offensive including the 
German war against commerce.98 In connection with the economy point 
( 4), he emphasized the indirect savings from the abolition of submarines 
which would be realized in destroyers and antisubmarine forces gener-
ally.99 The last point ( 5) opened up a new subject. It was explained that 
working conditions in submarines were cramped and the sailors suffered 
93 London Conf. 3. The proceedings and documents of this Conference also appear 
in United Kingdom Gov't, Documents of the London Naval Conference 1930 ( 1930). 
94 London Conf. 3 at 4. 
95 I d. at 78-82. 
96 Id. at 81. 
97 I d. at 78. Compare the quoted views with those expressed in Thuillier, "Can 
Methods of Warfare be Restricted?" 81 ]. Royal United Serv. Inst. 264 at 267-68 
(1936): 
If it were possible to induce other nations to forego the use of submarines it 
would be a great advantage to us, since it would rid us of fear of a weapon which 
very greatly neutralizes the power and scope of action of our battle fleets, and 
one which in the late war very nearly brought about our total defeat. But we 
should distinguish between proposals based on the plea of humanity and those 
based on self-interest. 
98 London Conf. at 79. 
99 Id. at 80. 
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from poor air when submerged. This was not in keeping with the improved 
standards urged generally for industrial workers.100 In addition, peacetime 
submarine accidents presented a grim peril. He pointed out that since 1918 
there had been twelve major disasters in the submarine forces of the five 
Powers represented at London with a loss of at least 570 men.101 Such 
losses, in the British view, could not be prevented by lifesaving equipment. 
Secretary of State Stimson, the chairman of the United States delega-
tion, - supported abolition in a short speech with the following central 
paragraph: 
The essential objection to the submarine is that it is a weapon 
particularly susceptible to abuse; that it is susceptible of use against 
merchant ships in a way which violates alike the old and well-estab-
lished laws of war and the dictates of humanity. The use made of the 
submarine revolted the conscience of the world, and the threat of its 
unrestricted use against merchant ships was what finally determined 
the entry of my own country into the conflict. In the light of our 
experience it seems clear that in any future war those who employ 
the submarine will be under strong temptation, perhaps irresistible 
temptation, to use it in the way which is most effective for immediate 
purposes, regardless of future consequences. These considerations con-
vince us that technical arguments should be set aside in order that the 
submarine may henceforth be abolished.102 
The only elaborate statement of opposition to abolition came from Mr. 
Leygues, the French Minister of Marine.103 In the French view, the sub-
marine was to be regarded as any other warship and it was sometimes 
more efficient than other warships and sometimes less so.104 The World 
War had proven the effectiveness of submarines against surface warships. 
Must it disappear because it disturbs the habits and the honored 
traditions of surface ships? It may happen to-morrow [sic] that every 
type of warship in the various navies will belong to the submarine 
class.105 
In the French view, the submarine was deemed the defensive weapon of 
the smaller navies.106 It would supplement the comparative weakness of 
100 I d. at 80-81. 
101 I d. at 81. 
102 I d. at 82. 
103 /d. at 84-88. 
104 I d. at 85. 
105 /d. at 85-86. 
106 I d. at 86. Compare the view expressed in Richmond, Sea Power in the Modern 
World 167 (1934): 
It is natural that the attitudes which the several Powers have taken regarding 
the submarine should have been governed by considerations of the advantages 
and disadvantages which would accrue to each from its abolition or retention. 
46 
the French surface fleet and provide scouts for it. It would maintain lines 
of communication between France and its overseas territories. In addition, 
alleged barbarity is to be ascribed to particular users of the submarine and 
not to the vessel itsel£.107 The development of the submarine was regarded 
as making it more capable of conforming to the rules applicable to sur-
face ships.108 The French Government believed that unrestricted submarine 
warfare against commerce should be outlawed/09 but France could not 
accept abolition of the submarine.110 
The Italian Foreign Minister stated that the abolition of submarines 
would favor the more powerful navies.111 Italy, however, did not object 
to abolition, in principle, provided that all the naval powers concurred 
and that it would bring about a drastic reduction of other armaments.112 
For the Japanese delegation, Admiral Takarabe argued for the retention 
of submarines because of Japan's geographical situation: 
Japan, consisting, as she does, of so many islands scattered so widely 
on the sea extending from the tropical to the frigid zones, sees in such 
kind of arm a convenient and adequate means to provide for her 
national defense. With this comparatively inexpensive war craft she 
can contrive to look after her extensive waterways and vulnerable 
points. Japan desires to retain submarines solely for this purpose.113 
(2) Limitation 
Submarines were treated similarly to the other principal types 
of warships by the Conference. Article 7 of the Treaty, applicable to all 
five Powers, provided the general rule that each submarine was to be 
limited to a maximum displacement of 2,000 tons with no gun above 5.1 
inch caliber.114 Three larger submarines with greater caliber guns were 
permitted for each Power.115 Article 16, applicable only to the United 
States, Great Britain, and Japan, limited the total submarines of each to 
52,000 tons.116 France and Italy did not accept limitations upon total 
tonnage. 
In summary, the limitations recognized the lawful combatant status of 
submarines by implication. The failure of abolition, even though the United 
Those attempts to arrive at a decision on the basis of its 'offensive' or 'defensive' 
character resulted in nothing more than special pleading. 
107 London Conf. 87. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 I d. at 88. 
111 I d. at 89-90. 
112 I d. at 91. 
113 I d. at 92. 
114 I d. at 208. 
115 Art. 7, paragraph 2. 
116 London Con/. 215. 
I 
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States supported the consistent British position,117 recognized their lawful 
combatant status more directly. Article 22 of the London Naval Treaty of 
1930118 set forth rules regulating submarines and other warships in their 
actions against merchant ships. Its subject, therefore, concerns the law-
fulness of the objects and methods of belligerent attack and assumes law-
ful combatant status. 
d. THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY (1936) 
In the opening speech of the Conference, British Prime Minister 
Baldwin mentioned that the British "still press for the abolition of the 
submarine." 119 This consistent objective was supported by the United 
States 120 and opposed by France.121 In the technical subcommittee Vice 
Admiral Robert of the French delegation stated that the question of the 
abolition of the submarine "should be buried forever." 122 The result was 
no further consideration of abolition during _ the Conference. 
A measure of qualitative limitation of submarines was achieved in the 
Treaty. It was provided that future submarines were not to exceed 2,000 
tons standard displacement or carry a gun in excess of 5.1 inches in cali-
ber.123 Other warships were limited analogously. 
4. The Spanish Civil War and the Second World War 
a. THE NYON AGREEMENT (1937) 
During the Spanish Civil War in 1937 attacks without warning 
were made by unknown submarines against non-Spanish warships and 
merchant ships.124 The United Kingdom and France took the lead in 
calling a special conference at N yon in order to condemn submarine at-
tacks upon such ships and to provide sanctions to deter the attacks.125 
The ensuing nine-Power agreement provided: 
Whereas arising out of the Spanish conflict attacks have been re-
peatedly committed in the Mediterranean by submarines against 
u
7 The interest of the British legal profession is illustrated by "Discussion on the 
Abolition of Submarines," 11 Grotius Trans. 65 ( 1925). 
us Article 22 is set forth in the text of Ch. III accompanying note 114. 
119 Dept. of State, The London Naval Conference 1935: Report of the Delegates of 
the United States of America, Text of the London Naval Treaty of 1936 and Other 
Documents 49 (Conference Series No. 24, 1936). 
120 I d. at 95. 
121 I d. at 59. 
122 I d. at 330. 
123 Art. 7. I d. at 32. The official text of this Treaty of March 25, 1936 is in 50 
Stat. 1363 (1937). ' 
124 Padelford, "Foreign Shipping During the Spanish Civil War," 32 A.j.I.L. 264 
at 270 (1938). 
125 I d. at 271. 
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merchant ships not belonging to either of the conflicting Spanish 
parties; and 
Whereas these attacks are violations of the rules of international 
law referred to in Part IV of the Treaty of London of April 22, 1930 
with regard to the sinking of merchant ships and constitute acts con-
trary to the most elementary dictates of humanity, which should be 
justly treated as acts of piracy . . .126 
The remainder of the Agreement specified "certain special collective 
measures against piratical attacks by submarines" including: 
Any submarine which attacks such a [merchant] ship in a manner 
contrary to the rules of international law referred to in the Inter-
national Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Arma-
ments signed in London on April 22, 1930, and confirmed in the 
Protocol signed in London on November 6, 1936 shall be counter-
attacked and, if possible, destroyed.127 
Article 22 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930, the juridical basis for 
the Nyon Agreement, provides certain rules for warships, both surface and 
submarine, to observe with regard to merchant ships. As a general rule, 
it is prescribed that such warships "may not sink or render incapable of 
navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew, 
and ship's papers in a place of safety." 128 Unlike the abortive Treaty 
Concerning Submarines and Noxious Gases/29 the London Naval Treaty 
makes no provision for assimilating naval personnel to pirates. The Nyon 
Agreement, therefore, goes beyond the London Treaty in this respect.130 
The juridical result of the Nyon Agreement is to deprive the personnel 
of the submarines concerned of status as lawful combatan~s when they 
carry out the attacks proscribed in the Nyon Agreement and deemed to be 
"piratical acts." The scholars have differed as to whether or not the Nyon 
Agreement is a proper extension of the Ia~ of piracy.131 The present 
significance of the Agreement, although it was an ad hoc arrangement 
for the Spanish Civil War, is that it was a high point in the international 
128 International Agreement for Collective Measures Against Piratical Attacks in the 
Mediterranean by Submarines, Nyon, Sept. 14, 1937, United Kingdom Treaty Series 
No. 38, p. 2 (1937); 31 A.].I.L. Supp. 179 (1937). 
127 /bid.; 31 A.].I.L. Supp. 179 at 180 (1937). The Nyon Supplementary Agree-
ment of Sept. 17, 193 7 extended the piracy concept to surface war vessels and aircraft. 
31 A.].I.L. Supp. 182 (1937). 
128 The full text of art. 22 appears in the text of Ch. III accompanying note 1-14. 
129 See the text accompanying notes 86, 87 supra. 
130 On the Nyon Agreement see generally 2 Hackworth 692-95. 
131 1 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law: Peace 613 (8th ed. 1955) and 
Padelford, op. cit. supra note 124 view it as a proper extension of piracy. The con-
trary view appears in Anonymous, "The Nyon Arrangements: Piracy by Treaty?" 
19 Brit. Y.B.I.L. 198 at 207-08 ( 1938) and Genet, "The Charge of Piracy in the 
Spanish Civil \Var," 32 A.].I.L. 253 at 263 ( 1938). 
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acceptance of the British juridical claim to make submarines and their 
personnel unlawful combatants.132 
b. THE UNDECLARED ATLANTIC NAVAL WAR (1941) 
On September 4, 1941 the United States destroyer Greer, en route 
to Iceland, was the object of an unsuccessful torpedo attack by a sub-
merged German submarine.133 President Roosevelt stated that, "This was 
piracy, legally and morally" 134 and "when you see a rattlesnake poised to 
strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him." 135 The 
President described the German attack as an aggression against "the free-
dom of the seas" 136 and stated that the United States would continue to 
defend this freedom by ordering the U.S. Navy to attack German or I tali an 
vessels which entered "waters the protection of which is necessary for 
American defense .... " 137 
The United States claim enunciated by President Roosevelt has been 
described as a defense measure against piratical attacks which were con-
trary to internation(!.l law.138 The use of the piracy terminology could be 
construed as a claim to deprive the particular submarine personnel of 
status as lawful combatants. In view of the context, including the lack of 
a declared war, it is probably more plausible to interpret the President's 
piracy wording as a part of a claim for the U.S. Navy to initiate attack in 
appropriate circumstances. Professor Lauterpacht, however, has approved 
the United States claim as a claim concerning piracy and stated: 
There is substance in the view that, by continuous usage, the notion 
132 In view of the prior French role in preserving the lawful combatant status of 
submarines, French agreement alone would have been significant. In addition to 
France and the United Kingdom the parties to the Agreement were: Bulgaria, Egypt, 
Greece, Roumania, Soviet Union, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. The Nyon Agreement 
cited supra note 126 at 8-9, 31 A.].I.L. Supp. 179 at 181 ( 1937). 
133 Factual description appears in Karig, Battle Report: The Atlantic War 67-70 
( 1946) 0 
It should be noted that the Greer was a 1,200 ton flush deck four pipe World War 
I destroyer of the same type as the fifty U.S. destroyers transferred to the United 
Kingdom in 1940 pursuant to the Churchill-Roosevelt Agreement. From a tactical 
standpoint it is thus possible that the attacking German submarine could have 
mistaken the Greer for a British destroyer. The Churchill-Roosevelt Agreement is set 
forth in 34 A.].I.L. Supp. 183 ( 1940). Commentary appears in Borchard, "The 
Attorney General's Opinion on the Exchange of Destroyers for Naval Bases," 34 
A.].I.L. 690 ( 1940) and Briggs, "Neglected Aspects of the Destroyer Deal," 34 
A.].I.L. 569 ( 1940). 
134 Add ress by the President (Sept. 11, 1941), U.S. Naval J1'ar College~ Interna-
tional Law Documents 1941 15 (1943) . 
1
3,'; I d. at 2 2. ' 
136 Id. at 19. 
137 I d. at 24. 
las 0 h . L h . ppen e1m- auterpac t, op. czt . supra note 131 at 613. 
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of piracy has been extended from its original meaning of predatory 
acts committed on the high seas by private persons and that it now 
covers generally ruthless acts of lawlessness on the high seas by whom-
soever committed.139 
c. THE PARTIAL "ABOLITIONJJ OF SUBMARINES (1945) 
During the Second World War submarines with increased efficiency 
were employed by, inter alia, Germany, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom. The principal claims and counterclaims relating to submarines 
concerned other legal issues than combatant status. 
At the close of World War II the remaining German and Japanese 
submarines were destroyed or divided among the principal victorious 
Allies.140 In 1966 the German Federal Republic 141 had submarines but 
apparently East Germany did not. In 1966 both Japan 142 and Italy 143 
had submarines. 
d. THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL AT 
NUREMBERG (1946) 
Admiral Donitz, who was one of the defendants in the trial before 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, had served first as head 
of the German submarine arm and then as commander in chief of the 
Navy.144 The argument of his counsel to the Tribunal referred briefly to 
the retention of an "effective weapon": 
The prosecution will perhaps take the standpoint that, in lieu of 
this [use of submarines inconsistent with article 22 of the London 
Naval Treaty of 1930], submarine warfare against armed merchant 
vessels should have been discontinued. In the last war the most ter-
rible weapons of warfare were ruthlessly employed by both sides on 
land and in the_ air. In view of this experience the thesis can hardly 
be upheld today that in naval warfare one of the parties waging war 
should be expected to give up using an effective weapon after the 
adversary has taken measures making the use of it impossible in its 
previous form. 145 
The Tribunal's Judgment applicable to Admiral Donitz did not respond 
expressly to the quoted claim. It is clear, however, that the Tribunal re-
garded submarines as lawful combatants. Its analysis was limited to other 
139 Id. at 613-14 (footnotes omitted). 
140 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents, 1941-49, S. Doc. No. 
123, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 41 ( 1950). 
141 Jane's Fighting Ships 1965-66 103; Les Flottes de Combat 1966 45-46. 
142 fane's Fighting Ships 1965-66 160; Les Flottes de Combat 1966 275. 
143 Jane's Fighting Ships 1965-66 147; Les Flottes de Combat 1966 264-65. 
144 1 I.M.T. 310. 
145 18 I.M.T. 315. 
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legal issues than combatant status but these other issues could not have been 
considered as they were except upon the implicit holding of the lawful 
combatant status of submarines.146 Apparently no question was raised 
concerning the lawful combatant status of military aircraft and their 
personnel.147 
C. SUBMARINES AS LAWFUL COMBATANTS 
The rejection of the claims to abolish the submarine have confirmed 
its lawful combatant status. In the same way the limitation of the sub-
marine by international agreement where other types of warships were 
subject to analogous restriction has also recognized the lawful combatant 
status of submarines and their personnel. Even the attempt to make sub-
marines conditional unlawful combatants, as where they fail to comply 
with particular rules concerning action against merchant ships, has been 
dropped. 
Con1bat interactions between submarines and merchant ships character-
ized both World Wars. It is important, therefore, to examine briefly the 
combatant status of merchant ships and their personnel. The Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 accord prisoner of war status and thus status as lawful 
combatants to the personnel of belligerent merchant ships.148 The Geneva 
Sea Convention includes among those entitled to prisoner of war status: 
Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the 
merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the 
conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any 
other provisions of international law.149 
It is particularly significant that merchant seamen are accorded prisoner 
of war status without regard to whether their ships are armed or not. In 
the same way no qualification is made concerning the action of merchant 
ships and, consequently, even Captain Fryatt, 150 who attempted to ram a 
German submarine, would now be entitled to prisoner of war status. Thus, 
the personnel of belligerent merchant ships are now entitled to prisoner of 
war status like the personnel of belligerent submarines. 
146 1 I.M.T. 310-15. 
147 See the judgment concerning Marshal Goring, the commander in chief of the 
German Air Force. 1 I.M.T. 279-82. 
148 To state that merchant ships and their personnel are lawful combatants is not to 
state that they are entitled to initiate attack against the enemy as if they were war-
ships. As a tactical matter such initiation of attack is unlikely anyway. See Colombos 
4 79-82 and Bellot, "The Right o( a Belligerent Merchantman to Attack," 7 Grotius 
Trans. 43 ( 1922). 
149 Art. 13 ( 5). The same provision appears in the Geneva Prisoners of War Con-
vention art. 4 ( 5). 
u;o See the text accompanying notes 2 7- 30 supra. 
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1. General War 
The submarine's status as lawful combatant has been retained because 
of the national interests or supposed national interests of some of the 
major naval powers and particularly of France.151 These national interests 
have included the use of the submarine as a militarily efficient warship 
and, particularly, its use in general war. The United States and the United 
Kingdom have upon occasion agreed to abolition of the submarine condi-
tioned upon the agreement of other powers. The same two states, however, 
later manifested their national interests by employing submarines in general 
war. 
In the contemporary era of nuclear armed and propelled submarines 
there are no governmental proposals to abolish the submarine.152 The 
principal thrust of contemporary disarmament proposals is directed at 
nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.153 These are the weapons which 
comprise the principal military capability of fleet ballistic missile sub-
marines. Effective nuclear disarmament would not, however, deprive sub-
marines of lawful combatant status. Thus, for the foreseeable future, 
submarine warships and their personnel will continue to have status as 
lawful combatants. 
2. Limited War 
It is clear that submarine warships and their personnel have the same 
de jure status as lawful combatants in limited war which they have in 
general war. Nevertheless, the strategic and tactical uses of submarines as 
a component of naval power may be expected to be considerably less in 
limited wars than in general wars. Professor Halperin has stated: "Sub-
marines have not been used extensively, if at all, in local wars . . .. " 154 
Apparently submarines were not used in the Korean War. The Soviet 
Union, which was in effect fighting the war by proxy/55 did not directly 
employ its submarines even though they could have constituted a major 
threat to the seaborne logistic support of the United Nations command. 
The United States, which also sought to limit the war in other ways, did 
151 See Royse 19-20. 
152 Gaddis Smith, Britain's Clandestine Submarines, 1914-1915 ( 1964) describes 
the secret shipping of submarine sections from the neutral United States to belliger-
ent Canada where they were assembled and completed. This suggests that if inter-
national abolition of submarines were to be successful it would require effective 
international inspection. 
153 See generally U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Agenda Item-
Peace (1964) ;-Arms Control: Issues for the Public (Henkin ed. 1961). 
154 See Garthoff 114. 
155 Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age 35 ( 1963). 
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not employ its submarines.156 There is no indication that submarines have 
been used in the war in Vietnam. 
The result is that, although submarines are de jure entitled to combatant 
status, they are not extensively employed in limited war. The nonuse, or 
at the most the very restricted use, of submarines is one way of keeping a 
war limited.157 Where the submarine is used for the same general purposes 
for which surface warships are used, as for gun bombardment of the shore, 
there is no reason that such action should increase the intensiveness or 
extensiveness of a limited war. 
156 Cagle & Manson do not record the use of United States submarines. 
157 Osgood 241-43 stresses the importance of limiting "military means." 

